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This article examines the advantages and drawbacks of internal knowledge integration versus collaborative outsourcing as two polar modes of governance in the design of application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). Increasing technological complexity, miniaturization and the generalization of markets for technology have induced higher integration constraints for designers. The pace of innovation and frequent changes in design rules require a tightly controlled design process.
As a consequence, knowledge integrators must develop expertise beyond the scope of their domain of activity if they are to ascertain the overall efficiency of systems. We find that although internalization of knowledge integration reduces coordination and agency-related costs, the involvement of partner firms in upstream design phases facilitates knowledge sharing and improves the coordination of innovation in modules. The analysis of the evolution of the ASICs industry shows that while large system integrators remain the dominant players, specialist firms are gaining market shares and do not hesitate to embark on the design of leading-edge systems. This result may simply reveal the increasing value of component knowledge in a disaggregated value chain. However, relying on a comparative case study of two similar development processes (one with each of the knowledge integration approaches) we confirm the strength of decentralized modes of governance on the condition that partner firms engage in a long-term relationship.
Introduction
This article addresses a central question in the study of industrial organization: how knowledge integrators define the boundaries of their knowledge domains? While they do not generally have all necessary expertise in-house, which domain of expertise do they internalize and how do they manage to integrate all bodies of knowledge in their products?
The semiconductor industry provides a rich ground for testing theories. Permanent technological revolutions and the consequent emergence of new markets impose great adaptive capacities. Not only do products and processes evolve but also competencies and the organization of activities are rapidly made obsolete by technical change. In recent years, the effectiveness of intellectual property rights and the extensive use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in design activities have amplified the trend toward decomposition of the value chain. Therefore, the explosion of so-called fabless and chipless firms 1 (Linden and Somaya, 2003) is easily explained by the reduction of transaction costs due to technical and institutional changes (Arora and Gambardella, 1994) . Recent literature stresses the impact of product modularization on both labor and knowledge divisions (Langlois and Robertson, 1995) . Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) argue that product modularization induces firms to partition their activities in relation with those modules, and this in turn favors specialization in dedicated bodies of knowledge. Consequently, it is not surprising to see firms align knowledge boundaries with production boundaries. However, not all modular value chains are alike. When changes in modules may affect the coherence and the performance of the system as a whole, they must be tightly controlled and coordinated. Thus, in industries characterized by loosely coupled value chains, 2 systems integrators must continue to develop technological knowledge dedicated to modules outsourced to specialists in order to accommodate changes that may affect the nature of complementarities and the uneven pace of innovation between components . It follows that, although an activity domain can be divided between specialist firms, systems integrators must develop knowledge outside the scope of their productive activities (Patel and Pavitt, 1997) and integrate knowledge from different sources Prencipe et al., 2005) . This article pushes this line of reasoning further by discussing the impact of mode of governance on the integration of dispersed bodies of knowledge. Although systems integrators develop knowledge beyond the scope of their activity domain, firms may be unable to operate the whole integration process effectively. Our claim is that although the setting up of an integrated knowledge system is crucial, this integration can be achieved by different cooperating entities (and it is more effective when it is done this way). After a brief study of the evolution of the application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) industry, the article relies on an in-depth case study to show how partners can share knowledge 3 and jointly define 1 Fabless have no manufacturing plants and systematically outsource their production. Chipless firms specialize in designing of microelectronics components and sell intellectual property.
design rules in order to overcome system failures and compensate subsequent transaction costs of decentralized coordination. The rest of the article is organized as follows. The Section 2 examines the theoretical issues at stake when considering the choice of best governance structure in knowledge intensive industries. Section 3 describes the relation between innovation and the evolution of the organization of the semiconductor industry. Section 3 looks at two similar projects undertaken in two companies by comparing their different coordination modes and related performance. Section 5 discusses the results, and concludes.
Theoretical background
For the last 30 years, the theory of the firm-how the boundaries of the firm are defined-has essentially used the concept of transaction costs to decide whether an activity should be made in-house or outsourced (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 . According to transaction cost economics, firms exist when producing in-house is cheaper than using the market as a decentralized coordination process. As is well known, market coordination may be costly when information asymmetry and uncertainty limit contractors' capacity to monitor activities. In particular, when the production process cannot be fully decomposed and thus undertaken by separate productive teams, it may be better for the owner to hire the team members and monitor their activity directly in order to limit the risk of moral hazard (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982; Cheung, 1983) , and to align team members' incentives with his own (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Thus, vertical integration assures the possession of the residual right and protects the owner from being held up. Second, uncertainty on ex ante investments may affect ex post bargaining positions and reduce the rent of the owner. This is particularly true when assets cannot be redeployed without cost when the contract ends (Klein et al., 1978) or when the contract cannot guarantee the control of the use of assets, which may lead to costly conflicts between co-contractors (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1988) . Hence, vertical integration eliminates ex-post transaction costs and thus improves investment incentives. Having said this, the literature has often justified outsourcing and disintegration of the value chains by the reduction of transaction costs compared with governance costs (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 Klein et al., 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). 4 However, this framework becomes difficult to apply when considering innovation (Williamson, 1985; Langlois, 1992; Langlois and Robertson, 1995) . More precisely, comparative static settings or game theoretic approaches hardly account for the dynamic relationship between technical change and the organization of productive activities.
5 Innovation may continuously modify the specificity of tradable assets, which often remains unpredictable ex ante, and affect agency and monitoring costs. The literature systematically concludes that when transaction costs are not predictable, it is crucial to keep the residual right on the asset to avoid unexpected consequences. Integration is, therefore, the most effective choice. Another stream of literature refuses to take transaction costs as given by exogenous conditions but rather considers that they are the outcome of a path dependent process determined by the evolution of industrial production processes and firm history (Langlois, 1992; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Jacobides and Winter, 2005) . As a consequence, transaction costs evolve endogenously with firms' conduct, changes in the division of labor, and the distribution of capabilities across the industry. Following this view, many authors stress the impact of product modularization on transaction costs, firm boundaries and organization of industries (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Meyer and Utterback, 1993; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 1997) . A modular system relies on design rules, which define the modes of relations between modules or components (through interfaces) for the system to perform a specific function (Baldwin and Clark, 1997) . One can distinguish between decoupled, loosely coupled and tightly coupled systems . In decoupled systems, components can change separately with no impact on the evolution of other components (no systemic effects). Conversely, tightly coupled systems cannot be decomposed at all. Loosely coupled systems exhibit systemic properties with separate components related by interfaces. Thus, loosely coupled systems require conscientious control of the architecture to prevent incompatibility and uneven changes between components. By standardizing interface specifications, the decomposition of products into separate components creates a high degree of independence between component designs, which facilitates the partitioning of activity (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) . This disentanglement of activities tends to lower transaction costs. First, it makes components re-usable in other products and interchangeable, thus reducing the specificity of assets. Second, it reduces coordination and monitoring costs by limiting information flows between activities and aligning incentives (Demsetz, 1988) . It also stimulates specialization and learning at components level, increases innovation opportunities and leverages system variation by mixing and matching changes in modules without affecting stability (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 5 Transaction costs models must consider innovation as an ad hoc dimension. Grossman and Helpman (1999) , for instance, analyze the consequences of the decision for integration decision on vertical specialization regarding different market structures by considering innovation as a potential source of contract incompleteness. Aghion and Tirole (1994) , consider innovation as a central determinant of the relevant level of integration. However, innovation is considered as an exogenous determinant of environmental conditions. Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Langlois, 2003) . It follows that product modularization shapes the vertical division of labor, which in turn favors knowledge specialization and creates boundaries within the knowledge base (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001; Schilling and Steensma, 2001) . When innovation in components or in design modules occurs autonomously, firms may focus on a component or on a sub-system and take advantage of economies of specialization by dividing innovative labor and reducing transaction costs between modules. In other words, product modularization enhances market-based coordination, which becomes more conducive to rapid technological change than is the case for integrated firms (Teece, 1996) .
The next two sections question this simplistic relation between products and organizational modularization and the effectiveness of innovation. First, we show that increasing complexity affects complementarities and then limits the benefits of market coordination. Second we discuss the specific dynamics of knowledge systems and the link between product, organizational and knowledge modularization. We then focus on discussing the arrangement that best achieves coordination of knowledge systems.
Complexity of technical systems
As Simon (1962) explained, complexity affects our ability to effectively design system architecture. For the same reasons, complexity of technical systems affects the relationship between modularization and coordination forms. Complexity may be intended to mean "depth"-the cognitive difficulty of handling a matter-as well as "breadth"-the range of areas or domains that have to be investigated to deal with a matter (Wang and von Tunzelmann, 2000) . Of course, complexity in breadthextension of the number of modules-may generate complexity in depth, but this is not necessarily so. Products and systems complexity are generally considered as complexity in breadth because they consist of a great number of interconnected components and subsystems or because they rely on a large number of technologies. When dealing with technical systems, complexity in depth is more problematic because it refers to the (in)ability to have the full representation of the functioning of the system (Rasmussen, 1985) . Complexity in depth generates uncertainty about the properties of relations between elements and thus the behavior and the evolution of the design and the performance of a system.
Modularization of products and organizations is often dependent on the level of maturity of technology, showing the relationship between evolution of technology and industry structure (Dibiaggio, 1999; Chesbrough, 2005) . In early stages, complexity inherent in interdependent technologies limits outsourcing possibilities due to the specificities of required capabilities and to the subsequent coordination and switching costs induced by market-based coordination (Chesbrough, 2005: 176) . As technology matures, problems are clarified and partitioned into separate tasks, Organization in the semiconductor industry which reduces complexity (Simon, 1962) . However, the system as a whole may become difficult to manage if complementarities between modules are likely to evolve in an unpredictable way (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) . Innovation, therefore, may increase complexity when it affects components and subsystems' interoperability. Then, control of the evolution of the systems' architecture-that is designbecomes a strategic issue, and the main source of transaction costs. It follows that the more complex a system, the more critical are monitoring and coordination of the dynamics of complementarities between assets (Teece, 1996) . Thus, tightly coupled systems and those systems whose interfaces between components or modules rely on uncertain technical features should not be coordinated through market transactions (Langlois and Roberson, 1992) .
Modularization and knowledge systems
As is well known, the characteristics of knowledge make it difficult to outsource. Non-rivalry, partial tacitness, difficult monitoring and metering when used, and frequent systemic effects are factors that make knowledge difficult to transmit. These difficulties engender market failures, which reduce transaction opportunities. It follows that knowledge-intensive activities are more likely to be managed in-house (Teece, 1986) . Nonetheless, the increased use of ICTs and intellectual property rights has boosted markets for technology (Arora and Gambardella, 1994) . Furthermore, the disembodiment of knowledge from tangible goods and the decomposition of products have facilitated the organization of knowledge systems as 'loosely-coupled' systems (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) . The modularization of a knowledge system eases the identification and the codification of knowledge about standards, which then can serve as references for the coordination of independent entities (Argyres, 1995) . Modularization also reduces uncertainty and complexity and helps identify problem and solution paths, enhancing learning processes (von Hippel and Tyre, 1995; Sanchez, 2000) . It further improves knowledge system monitoring and predictability, and lowers the limits of knowledge transfers within and between organizations (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Sanchez, 2000) . In the terms of Milgrom and Roberts (1992) , this reduces motivation-and coordination-based transaction costs. Finally, modularization improves scale and scope economies related to knowledge capitalization since knowledge obsolescence is limited to modules (Langlois, 1999) . In other words, by sharing common standards, external economies usually enjoyed by integrated firms are dispersed and benefit all firms working in the network.
Recent empirical work has confirmed the relation between knowledge systems modularization, the increasing division of innovative labor and the dramatic changes in market conditions (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Fosfuri et al., 1999) . In particular, authors have highlighted the explosion of markets for technology through licensing, patenting and cross licensing agreements, research contracts, intangibles (such as software, algorithms, or design modules), joint ventures or mergers, and acquisitions, and the subsequent emergence of firms specialized in the development of (component) knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Hall and Ham, 1999; Kortum and Lerner, 1999) .
However, decentralized coordination is limited in fast changing activities where arms' length relationships do not facilitate knowledge transfer and integration (Pavitt, 2005) . In the design of multi-technology products, each specialist often creates new knowledge to meet new requirements. These creations can be disruptive to existing complementarities between domains of specialization. It follows that overall performance depends on the coherent integration of knowledge across boundaries of knowledge domains (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) . All firms acting at each layer of the system must share a common understanding of the architecture and of the evolution of each module. As a consequence, when unbalanced changes in component knowledge generate systemic changes, decentralized coordination may increase temporal asset specificity and substantially raise transaction costs due to systemic changes (Masten, 1984; Langlois, 1992; Teece, 1996; Somaya and Teece, 2001 ). Furthermore, system knowledge is essentially practical knowledge and is not easy to share (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) . 6 As a consequence, it often requires to be coordinated by a single entity. A series of studies have deepened this argument and highlighted the distinction between the division of labor and the division of knowledge in firms specialized in the design, development, and manufacturing of multicomponent and multitechnology products. Studying the aircraft engine industry, Prencipe (1997) and show that specialization in certain activity domains (such as digital control systems) may not be accompanied by specialization in related knowledge domains. Unbalanced dynamics between modules may destabilize the system and affect its reliability. It is very unlikely that the market spontaneously develops the required competencies to deal with unpredicted interactions between components (Pavitt, 2005) . This means that a specific entity-a systems integratormust have the capacity to design and test system architecture and develop knowledge in technologies underlying the modules produced by others . Caciatorri and Jacobides (2004) further argue that value chain disintegration and vertical division of labor compartmentalize the knowledge base of a sector and consequently shape the capability development process. Analyzing the building industry in the UK, they show that re-integration was needed to create required capabilities to respond to specific demands (see also Jacobides and Winter, 2005) . More generally, the argument is that integrating diverse bodies of knowledge into a coherent system is easier to organize in-house. Common identity, shared values and standardized communication channels facilitate knowledge sharing and improve organizational learning capacities (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka and Takeushi, 1995) .
However, while salient in specific industries, this observation may not be general. Evidence shows that several projects aiming to design and develop complex multitechnology products may be coordinated and managed in very different ways with no normative conclusion. For instance, Langlois (2004) shows that in the cluster tools 7 industry different development paths continue to compete because "the forces favoring integrality and those favoring modularity are relatively balanced" (p. 19). Similarly, Linden and Somaya (2003) cannot determine the best coordination mode in the design of semiconductor chips. Although facing uneven rates of evolution in components and subsystems, they show that the coordinating mode of modules depends on the firms' history and strategy regarding standards. Interestingly, they explain that firms may combine both alternative modes of coordination in different projects. Jacobides and Hitt (2005) consider such "mixed modes of governance" observed in the mortgage banking industry as a strategic means to leverage comparative advantages between firms' internal labor division and their downstream specialists.
Building on these results we propose that: (i) although designing the architecture of a system requires knowledge integration, this process need not necessarily be managed by a single entity but can be undertaken by a set of cooperating partners; (ii) the mode of governance chosen to coordinate systems knowledge is a source of competitive advantage, which depends on firms' specific attributes. The arbitrage between internal versus cooperative knowledge integration relies on accessibility to distributed bodies of knowledge, on the firm's history, its business experience, its ability to manage cooperation and its specific organization of activities in-house.
The next section describes the strategic and organizational challenges induced by the increasing complexity of design activities in the semiconductor industry, and emphasizes the critical role of system and knowledge integration. If technological changes have dramatically modified the organization of the industry by disintegrating the value chain, systems integrators have continued to lead the development of cutting edge products. However, the trend is not clear since specialist firms are gaining market share. This calls into question the competitive advantage of organizing knowledge integration in-house.
3. Increasing technological complexity in the semiconductor industry
Speed and variety of technological change
The speed of innovation in the semiconductor industry since its infancy is a well known phenomenon. A series of complementary inventions (vacuum tube in 1906, point contact transistor, 1947, junction transistor, 1948, diffusion-oxide maskingphoto process, 1954 , the integrated circuit in 1958 and planar technology in 1959) contributed to shape a technological paradigm in the semiconductor industry (Dosi, 1982) . Spurred by tremendous progress in complementary scientific domains and by industry requirements for smaller, more powerful and cheaper devices, technological progress has matched Moore's predictions. 8 The integration trend 9 -the placement of an increasing number of electronic components on a single integrated circuit-has stimulated successive product and process innovations giving rise to the opening of new markets, new applications and strategic revolutions (Figures 1 and 2) .
On the manufacturing side, the increase both in number and quality of final applications has resulted in strong pressure for higher performance of integrated circuits (ICs) in terms of capacity, flexibility, functionality, power consumption, cost, and miniaturization. As a consequence, the integration process of new components in devices, constrained by shorter product life cycles, price decreases and market unpredictability, puts pressure on manufacturing technology. Efficiency improved rapidly when MOS technology (Metal Oxide Semiconductor invented in 1963) became the dominant manufacturing technological standard.
10 MOS technology gave birth to a series of co-evolving technologies (PMOS, NMOS, ECL, TTL, and S/LD TTL) that regularly improved productivity. They were eventually rendered obsolete by the CMOS technology introduced in the early seventies for calculators and watches, and generalized in the eighties for logic chips. 8 In particular, progress in line width relies on innovations at physical level, which have been driven by the improvement of the properties of bulk materials and are now increasingly dependent on the physics of material interfaces between atomic scale films. Until recently, this research was based on the statistical properties of atom distribution; it is now conditioned by the precise position of atoms as line width decreases. The possibility of reducing line width below 0.1-micron will require a radical change in materials with the expected use of biological and/or quantum materials.
9 The integrated circuit was followed by the medium scale integration (MSI) in the sixties, the large scale integration (LSI) in the seventies, the very large scale integration in the eighties and the ultra large scale integration (ULSI) in the 1990s. 10 Other technologies (such as digital bipolar) are still available and used for specific applications.
MOS devices are actually slower than bipolar ones but they consume less power and generate less heat. However, a regain of interest in bipolar technology may appear with the emergence of new applications.
Organization in the semiconductor industry 247 CMOS technology provided the benefits of standardization in production: continuous improvements in lithography, tests and yield, exhibited by sustainable growth in capital investments and R&D spending. These improvements permitted important scale and learning effects.
Design complexity
On the design side, the trend has not been that regular. Designers have experienced increasing difficulties in keeping up the pace of progress imposed by manufacturing technologies and have failed to achieve required throughput. This phenomenon has several explanations. First, technology, following Moore's law, has constantly changed the constraints on the design environment. The speed of change obliges designers to start projects with imprecise technical specifications that may prove different at the implementation phase (see Section 3.3.). This time lag between the two activities may engender major changes in design. Secondly, the number of transistors 11 and functions performed by chips thanks to embedded software is increasing exponentially (Figure 3) . As a consequence, the design flow must assure functional correctness and achieve timing, power, reliability, manufacturability, signal integrity, and testability requirements. This increasing complexity requires a corps of highly skilled and more broadly trained designers. It also requires computer-aided design tools that cater for factors that could not be taken into account by previous technology generations.
Thirdly, the design trend has been to operate within relatively stable design rules, to use design software-electronic design automation (EDA) tools-more extensively and to advocate design module or Intellectual Property (IP) re-use capacities. Designers are provided access to a library of large, previously designed components, or "cores," with the goal of enabling them to develop their system rapidly by assembling a network of these cores. While useful in standard products, this strategy proves ineffective for ASICs 12 (Application Speficific Integrated Circuits) designed to develop leading edge products such as wireless handsets (Dibiaggio, 1999) or in cutting edge memory devices (Macher, 2001) . Unlike standard products, ASIC design remains firm specific or even team specific, based on designers' experience and is an essential source 11 The number of transistors per chip is increasing at a compound annual growth rate of about 60%, (Semiconductor Industry Association, 1999).
12 ASICs are products tailored for specific customer needs. Taken literally, ASICs are made for one customer and dedicated to one particular type of system/application. However, there are different types of ASICs (Dataquest, 1999) ranging from full-custom ICs (produced for a single user) to cellbased ICs (Integrated Circuits customized by using automatic tools and sometimes standardized elements). Unlike standardized products, ASICs need specific design architectures and embedded software. As a consequence, knowledge and design reuse is not easy.
Organization in the semiconductor industry 249 of differentiation. One of the main challenges faced by ASIC designers is design productivity. Despite the fact that huge improvements have been made by design tools, design throughput has not been able to keep pace with the increases in chip complexity since 1981 (Linden and Somaya, 2003) . Together with the reduced cycle time of projects, this productivity gap obliges design teams to permanently rethink their design flow, re-evaluating design methodology and organization in order to overcome the problems caused by the increasing number of engineers in project teams. A new design paradigm has progressively invaded the designers' community, facilitating the integration of all components on a single chip. System-on-a-chip (SOC) is a design methodology enabling the consolidation of different systems-previously supported by dedicated ICs integrated on a printed circuit board-in a single chip (Linden and Somaya, 2003) . Beyond miniaturization, SOC is expected to reduce costs by facilitating IP and design reuse. However, SOC imposes new coordination constraints on design teams, which makes it difficult to implement, and may change the rules of the competitive game. Inducing a higher level of integration, knowledge systems management is an issue, particularly when some modules used to be outsourced. A more detailed examination of the design flow in Section 4 will make this point clearer.
Organization of the industry
The first era of the industry's evolution saw the development of large integrated firms such as Texas Instruments, AT&T, IBM, Fairchild, and later National Semiconductor, Intel, etc. They internalized the whole value chain, from the production of manufacturing equipment to commercialization. Specialized manufacturing equipment producers emerged in the 1960s, but vertically integrated firms dominated until the 1980s. The stability of the CMOS technology facilitated design modularization and the progressive dominance of component specialists. In the 1980s, firms such as Texas Instruments progressively abandoned their activities in consumer electronics and concentrated on components, while integrated firms such as Motorola lost their competitiveness in several IC (Integrated Circuit) products. Furthermore, the shift from mass market to ASICs emphasized the role of design in the value creation process and, caused another dramatic change in the 1980s. This spurred the technological decoupling of IC design from manufacturing technology (Hobday, 1991) , thereby creating an independent market for design modules. Combined with the legal recognition of the value of patents, the market for technology developed and stimulated the emergence of "fabless" firms. Fabless companies systematically outsource the manufacturing process to their counterpart pure play founders specialized in manufacturing and testing. Vertically integrated firms may also outsource part of their business to contract manufacturing in order to avoid excess capacities (Macher et al., 2002) . The ASIC segment is probably the most dynamic of the industry.
Since the beginning of the Nineties, the diffusion of ICTs in design activities has notably enhanced the trend of disintegration with the success of chipless firms, such as SPARC, Rambus, ARM Ltd., MIPS Technology or DSP Group, specialized in licensing out "IP blocks" or "design cores," i.e. sub-chip design modules. Their success relies on limiting their activity to licensing out design solutions to component or integrated firms. These firms generally specialize in a very narrow market, usually focusing on a single product or even a single product-market combination. 13 Since the end of the 1990s, more than 200 firms have entered the market with this business model. However, fewer than 100 still survive and only ARM Ltd., Rambus, MIPS and DSP Group have managed to be successful by licensing out high-value design modules (Linden and Somaya, 2003) . Finally, new aided design tools (EDA) opened the market to specialists who could provide dedicated software in order to support innovation trends in design. Interestingly, focusing on complex products, ASICs providers remained integrated firms. As explained in Section 2, this phenomenon is justified by the management of dynamic complementarities, which reduce the advantage of market-based coordination (Macher, 2001) . Ex ante uncertainty about design solutions increases the risks of contract incompleteness and transaction costs. As a consequence, large vertically integrated firms have continued to enjoy a competitive advantage, which justifies their relative leadership. Overall, in the nineties the ASIC market was dominated by big incumbent firms such as IBM, Lucent, and NEC LSI Logic (Table 1) . This domination was further emphasized by the scope of their technological knowledge, much larger than that of their activity portfolio (Figure 4) . This confirms the argument of : systems integrators master all the competencies required to design a chipset, chipless firms and foundries only develop competencies specific to their activity domain, and are not able to control the ASIC design flow.
However, this observation may be misleading. First, the Herfindahl index of the ASIC industry was still 0.05 in 1999 with 59 active players, 39 of which occupied less than 1% of the market. Furthermore, the concentration ratio had tended to increase in the 1990s. It has sharply decreased over the last 3 years, suggesting that systems integrators are progressively losing market share to the benefit of specialist firms such as Intel, Qualcomm and Texas Instruments (Table 1) .
Thus, the decrease in leadership of system integrators remains to be explained given the prominent role played by knowledge integration induced by the increasing use of the SOC methodology.
The next section uses a case study to illustrate how knowledge integration can be handled in a decentralized way in the design of complex products. It further 13 ARM Ltd. is almost exclusively focused on micro-controller units (MCU) dedicated to cellular mobile handsets and base stations. MIPS is the uncontested leader in MCU dedicated to video play stations and DSP Group is specialized in the design of Digital Signal Processors (DSP) essentially developed for mobile phones and base stations.
Organization in the semiconductor industry highlights the balancing of advantages/disadvantages of the two modes of governance regarding the knowledge integration process.
Case study
This case study, which started in November 2000, is part of a large project on Complex Products and Systems (Hobday et al., 2000) . The case compares similar projects (aiming to design exactly the same product) 14 undertaken in two different semiconductor companies. Starting approximately at the same time, the comparison will enable us to emphasize the impact of the two modes of governance of the knowledge integration process on each project's performance. The projects under the spotlight concentrate on the design of a cutting edge ASIC chip 15 dedicated to the third generation of mobile handsets (UMTS 16 ). Several elements made these projects particularly challenging. First, it was a new experience for both companies in the UMTS technology and time to market was strategic. 14 The two companies happened to develop exactly the same chipset at the same time, which makes the comparison fruitful. 15 The ASIC was a Digital Signal Processor (DSP) embedded in a chip. 16 Universal Mobile Telecommunication System is the third generation of cellular phones providing wide range of services including telephony, paging, messaging, Internet, and broadband data.
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The teams in charge of the projects in both companies had approximately the same expertise in design, although ORG 1 was more experienced in managing one-off solutions projects and ORG 2 was more highly endowed with cutting edge technical expertise. Second, the two companies opted for a "one chip solution," which aims to integrate almost all digital functions in a single chip. Third, they decided to test the SOC methodology which, as explained earlier, had serious organizational implications. Finally, they both relied on a network of partners, owners of strategic bodies of knowledge.
17
After describing the projects and the firms, the two organizations will be compared and evaluated on the basis of two performance criteria: time to market and number of designers-quarters (DQs).
18 Although this mode of assessment may be limited, 19 it is a reasonable approximation for stressing the benefits and drawbacks of the two governance modes. The study focused on organizational practices, and was conducted over 2 years from the start to product delivery. We assembled a panel of 19 hardware engineers and 23 software engineers involved in all development phases of the projects, in marketing and in customer support. Five managers from each company were also interviewed. Interviews were organized on a regular basis (every three months). We conducted one-on-one semi-structured interviews with engineers, lasting between 50 and 90 minutes. Interviews with managers were more informal and lasted approximately 90 minutes. A series of interviews with managers of three partner firms 20 were also organized on a yearly basis.
In addition to interviews and observations, we collected data by reviewing extensive company documentation as well as data from surveys and studies dedicated to semiconductors (Dataquest studies, ICE studies, Sematech studies, Semico studies, Cahner In-Stat Group documents, Numetrics Management Systems' study (2000), ITRS documents, working papers, and discussion papers from research teams interested in the semiconductor industry, technical journals and other data available on the Internet).
Description of companies
The first organization (henceforth ORG 1) 21 is an integrated manufacturer known for its competitive advantage in design cycle time, particularly when dealing with 17
They shared similar partners such as ARM Ltd, for instance.
18
Designer-quarters express the number of designers multiplied by the number of quarters spent to accomplish a specific phase.
19
For instance, this does not take technical performance of the products into account.
20
One partner was involved in the two projects.
21
The names of the two organizations remain hidden for reasons of confidentiality. 254 highly customized solutions. ORG 1 is used to cooperating with specialist companies such as DSP Group and ARM ltd. ORG 1 has always shared knowledge with its partners and tends to favor co-development of design solutions. More than simply an altruistic posture, this is a strategic intention: partners invited to commit to given architectures will re-use it in other projects and turn it into a standard on which ORG 1 will keep an advantage over outsiders. ORG 1 is a typical Silicon Valley firm characterized by high organizational flexibility and reluctant to implement formal procedures in its activities.
The other organization (henceforth ORG 2) is the semiconductor division of a large European consumer electronics company. Working essentially at the behest of business lines, ORG 2 is specialized in standard mass market products and is famous for the reliability of its products. Dealing with large batches requires a different organizational focus: reliability lies in the respect of procedures and coherence between teams. Internal contracts establish a market-like relationship, except that internal conflicts are solved by the corporate board, which limits ex post transaction costs.
In ORG 1, teams enjoy great autonomy generating different management styles and organizations. Team managers consider themselves responsible for a quasiindependent firm: they can negotiate and engage in new contracts or outsource activities that could be undertaken by other teams of the company. On the contrary, managerial autonomy is limited in ORG 2. Teams cannot start working on a project before the contract is approved by the board. Thus, priority is given to monitoring resource allocations and limiting redundancy.
The focus of the two companies on different businesses also justifies two opposing organizational modes for coordinating the design flow. ORG 2 decided to handle systems integration, knowledge integration and to concentrate on modules they could develop internally. They outsourced loosely coupled modules to expert specialists who had no competence in system knowledge. ORG 1 preferred to share the knowledge integration process with partners in order to better define complementarities between modules and prevent technical inconsistencies. The next section provides further details on the design flow and emphasizes the challenges faced by the two organizations.
Design flow
The design flow consists of four phases ( Figure 5 ). The first phase is a succession of analytical steps aiming to define the expected functional performance of the product and of modules, the technical requirements, the architecture of the system, and the allocation of tasks between partners. The architecture and benchmarking exercise compares previous generations and competitors' products with envisaged designs and sets up a broad architecture of the system. This phase requires specific expertise but does not directly affect the organization of the design flow. However, it is a Organization in the semiconductor industry strategic one because it sets the functional targets, selects the subsystems, components, or algorithms to be implemented taking into account tradeoffs between cycle time, performance, cost, hardware versus software solutions, etc. As illustrated by figure 6, ORG 1 and ORG 2 organized their design flow differently. ORG 2 decided to outsource phase 1 to consultants who already had extensive knowledge of the architecture and performance of competitors' products. ORG 1, on the contrary, decided to cooperate with downstream partners and focus on the definition of the forthcoming system at the expense of benchmarking competitors' products.
Next, the macro-architecture defines a set of instructions on which designers will rely in phases 2 and 3. Macro-architecture is a long and difficult task requiring competencies in almost all technical domains as well as a good knowledge of customer needs. Macro-architecture must also take into account the specific organization of the company and its experiences in previous projects in order to make sure resources will be adequately allocated during the project. Phase 2 implements all functional prescriptions defined by macro-architecture at the hardware level. It consists of a precise description of each component and module requirements in order to optimize the performance of the overall system. Systemic effects and uncertainty on performance of technology 22 makes this phase Organization in the semiconductor industry 257 particularly difficult. When phase 2 is finished, interfaces between modules and components are well defined, and the design path is made clear to all partners. Then, phase 3 can be launched and each specialist will be able to concentrate on his component. In charge of systems integration, ORG 2 decided to undertake knowledge integration by itself. It provided its partners with micro-architecture, software architecture, and specifications to follow in order to design modules and components. ORG 1 involved its partner in the construction of the knowledge system. In particular, DSP Group (responsible for the development of software tools) and ARM ltd (responsible for the delivery of a microcontroller unit to be integrated in the chipset) made a significant contribution to phase 2. This approach imposes operational constraints. As is well known, knowledge is partly tacit: to be shared it relies on trust and personal relationships. The manager of the project organized several meetings with partners: engineers spent ten days together at the initiation stage of the project. They subsequently communicated on a daily basis using video conferencing and telephone.
23 E-mailing was also used extensively. After the start of phase 3, engineers continued to meet every 4-6 months. As a consequence, although the design of the architecture (systems integration) remained fully defined in-house, related system knowledge was freely given to partners.
24
Phase 3 consists of two parallel processes. On the one hand, the implementation of the architecture design (left hand side of Figure 5 ) aims to develop specific blocks.
25 The development process of these blocks can be viewed as a linear succession of different phases aiming to implement the hardware of the IC. This stage consists of three tightly-coupled activities (RTL, Logic synthesis, and Gate Level representation) relying on heterogeneous types of expertise. These three activities are undertaken in the same sequence in each module. Both ORG 1 and ORG 2 carried out the design of the core chip of the hardware, which is the motor of the system, and necessitates strategic expertise. However, remember that ORG 1 had to communicate the specification of the hardware design to its main partners in phase 2. On the other hand, software architecture-developed simultaneously-aims to integrate different tools or functions in the system. Some are embedded in the IC to add functionalities to the system; others are simulation and emulation tools that facilitate implementation and testing in the subsequent phases of the project. Here again, ORG 2 kept in-house activities that were tightly coupled with the core chip Communication was constrained by time differences between countries.
It is usually kept secret because it is considered as a key determinant of competitive advantage. This "gift" contributed to establishing a relationship of trust between partners. Potential externalities such as the adoption of the system by future customers were also expected.
25
Blocks consist of independent modules (such as Bit-Manipulation Unit, the Data Addressing Arithmetic Unit or the Program Control Unit) encompassing a set of instructions that perform a specific function. 258 they had to develop (debugger, simulator, and emulator) and outsourced loosely coupled modules, whose development could not directly affect the development of the core (Assembler-Linker and C-Compiler). ORG 1 had the same approach by outsourcing the same modules as ORG 2. But the debugger, the simulator and the emulator were developed with partners.
Finally, layout is dedicated to the implementation of each block to prepare the manufacturing process and the tests. It also collects and organizes all technical information useful for the customer. It finally prepares the implementation of the design on the chip for manufacturing. Layout can be left more or less open depending on the willingness of customers to customize the system by themselves. The two firms have different layout strategies. Thus this phase will not be analyzed as an element of the comparison between ORG 1 and ORG 2.
Results
The assessment of the two projects relies on comparing the cycle times (expressed in quarters) and on estimating the resources spent in each phase (expressed in designers-quarters or DQs). Figure 7 shows two complementary results. In terms of project cycle time, ORG 2 proved slightly better than ORG 1: the design implementation phase was accomplished one and a half quarters earlier. This result is directly linked with the governance mode of systems integration: the decision to keep strategic blocks of activities in-house permitted ORG 2 to better coordinate the sequence of activities. Resources could be re-allocated smoothly, new phases started before the previous ones had actually finished. On the contrary, ORG 1 had to operate more sequentially, waiting for the green light from partners before starting new phases.
Furthermore, ORG 1 had to overcome coordination problems during phase 3. While working with the same automated design and communication tools, partners updated their equipment separately. This resulted in incompatibility and heavy ORG 1 to rewrite these instructions with its partner, which caused serious delays in phase 2. Thirdly and more damagingly, a conflict of interest occurred between ORG 1 and DSP Group. They were co-responsible for the design of the core component using the architecture designed by ORG 1. DSP Group used this architecture design to establish an intermediary core, arguing that the component they were developing together was too far in advance of the market. DSP Group then tried to impose this intermediary solution, which ORG 1 refused to adopt. Relationships between the partners subsequently deteriorated over several months. As a result, DSP Group did not allocate enough resources to develop the component on time. As one engineer put it, "at that time it was clear that our project was not their priority anymore." This conflict caused several months delay.
On the contrary, ORG 1 proved much better in the management of each phase: the cumulated time spent on the three phases was 13 quarters for ORG 1 and 18 for ORG 2. The gap is even more dramatic when considering the resources spent in the three phases: ORG 1 spent 69 DQs whereas ORG 2 spent 208 DQs. Part of the explanation is related to organizational and managerial issues. But the main reason originates in the governance of knowledge integration. Insufficient cooperation between ORG 2 and its partner during phase 1 resulted in ambiguous specifications deeply affecting the micro-architecture. This in turn obliged ORG 2 to spend twice as much as ORG 1 in phases 1 and 2 (25.5 DQs vs 52 DQs for ORG 2).
The explanation for the advantage of ORG 1 in phase 3 (44 DQs for ORG 1 compared with 156 DQs ORG 2) 27,28 lies in the coordination mode between tool designers and hardware designers. As explained earlier, in ORG 2, tools were developed in-house in modules where the company had good expertise and in
26
A decoder is embedded software, which translates digital signals received by the handset into voice.
27
Of course we make the hypothesis that the output is equivalent, which cannot be true. But whatever error may be due to underestimating output performances, the result would not be dramatically different.
28
Notice that we could not monitor resources invested by partners in the software development process as we did for the two organizations. However, if we limit the comparison to hardware, the result is more robust. We then find 78 DQs for ORG 2 to be compared with 20 DQs for ORG 1. Thus, the ORG 1 design team proved to be four times more efficient than ORG 2. 260 modules that were tightly coupled with hardware (debuggers and simulators). Conversely, they outsourced loosely coupled software tools that could be handled by specialist firms (C compiler). Because ORG 1 and partners had cooperated in the knowledge integration phase, they continued to exchange knowledge about both hardware and software characteristics on a daily basis and could easily cooperate on the design of tightly coupled software. This permitted ORG 1 to benefit from the partners' expertise and further contribution: because they participated in the definition of the architecture, they knew the impact of their task on modules developed by other partners. As a consequence, ORG 1 was able to reduce both the development time and the learning time required to implement tools in the system.
Discussion and conclusion
In dynamically competitive environments, knowledge integration is the essence of organizational capability and a crucial source of sustainable competitive advantage (Grant, 1996) . Our results are consistent with Langlois (2004) and Linden and Somaya (2003) : while the systemic nature of technology and the difficulties of writing efficient contracts for exchanging bodies of knowledge have led companies to internalize chip design and knowledge integration, the increasing diversity of technology and the development of markets for technology have limited the definition of normative governance choices. The boundaries of the firms defined in terms of its range of products and in terms of its range of knowledge rarely correspond perfectly, particularly when the technological environment is dynamic. Knowledge in wireless technology created to design a chipset for a GSM handset will be easily re-used and extended to develop a base station module or component. On the contrary, given the increasing number of technologies embedded in products and the limited access to knowledge protected by patents, firms cannot master all bodies of knowledge required to design products' architecture. Knowledge integrators must know much more than they require in direct support of what they do: although ORG 1 and ORG 2 do not design or develop specific software and components such as voice coders and decoders, they need to know about software design and analog/digital translation. The question is, how far should they rely on their sole expertise to define the specifications of systems' architecture?
This article goes further than have previous studies by examining carefully the impact of the governance structure on the management of knowledge integration. On the one hand, internalizing knowledge integration facilitates the management of architectural knowledge, which is often embedded in the implicit knowledge of the organization, and in formalized as routines (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson, 1996) . This process relies more on know-how and practical knowledge than on Organization in the semiconductor industry documents and procedures, and therefore requires a shared language, methods, artifacts, and trust. This is particularly true in complex environments where novelty is high and new knowledge is disruptive to relationships between domains of expertise (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) . Furthermore counting on partners' expertise to co-design the system exposes the firm to moral hazard and adverse selection. The conflict between DSP Group and ORG 1 was costly and could have been more damaging.
On the other hand, collaborative knowledge integration may prove more effective when there is a lack of correspondence between product and knowledge boundaries and when there is a rapid change in technology breadth and depth because it then becomes difficult to determine the potential value of new knowledge. Then, speed of access to knowledge is critically important to improve time to market (Grant, 1996) . In this article, empirical observation highlights the balancing trend of competitive advantage between system integrators and knowledge specialists in the ASIC sector. This result may simply reveal the increasing value of component knowledge in a disaggregated value chain. However, the comparative case study also shows that collaborative knowledge integration can prove superior if certain conditions are fulfilled. First, the creation of an inter-firm knowledge base requires the setting up of a shared language and a common vision relying on mutual trust. This is a long-term endeavor, which requires solid experience in managing partnerships (Pisano et al., 2001) . Second, knowledge creation is facilitated if the company does not prevent the emergence of niches of activities outside the formal structures. Teams in ORG 1 are endowed with great autonomy in their decision-making regarding choice of partners and resources allocation. This has favored the establishment of long-term relationships between partners that do not necessarily rely on contracts. Conversely, ORG 2 relies on codified procedures and imposes strict monitoring of resources allocation at each stage of the project. This causes delays in making strategic decisions, such as rewriting the micro-architecture specifications, and generates frustration in team members and collaborating firms. Thus, the lack of autonomy limits capacity to engage in long-term relationships.
Finally, a number of critical issues remain open to further investigations on the coordination of knowledge integration and its impact on industrial organization: (i) the dynamics and the interconnectedness between knowledge domains and activity domains have yet to be fully understood; (ii) the governance of knowledge systems also needs better understanding. In particular, the definition of the required environment for the management of knowledge integration is difficult to grasp when the firm is the unit of analysis. It is possible that long-term cooperation between partner teams generates more proximity than institutional ownership by a firm.
